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WRONGFUL INCARCERATION CAUSES
SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM:
WHY LAWYERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
BREACH CONFIDENTIALITY TO HELP
EXONERATE THE INNOCENT
Vania M. Smith+
“Because four attorneys signed [a] notarized forty-five word affidavit . . . on
March 17, 1982—roughly only one month after my arrest—and felt duty-bound
to keep it secret, I served twenty-six years in prison, almost half of my life at the
time, for a murder I didn’t commit.”1
- Alton Logan
In February 1982, Alton Logan was arrested on the south side of Chicago,
charged with the murder of a security guard.2 In March 1982, Andrew Wilson
was asked by his attorneys if he committed the crime for which Logan was
awaiting trial.3 Wilson confessed.4 After this confession, the attorneys had to
decide either to maintain the confidential relationship with their client by
keeping this confession secret, or to disclose the confession in an effort to clear
Logan. One of the attorneys met with a judge who advised that the client’s
confidence must be kept.5 After consideration, the attorneys decided to create a
signed affidavit, outlining the details of the confession, which was kept hidden
in a strongbox.6 At trial, Logan was convicted of the crime and sentenced to life
+
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Washington University (2001); B.A. Political Communication, The George Washington University
(1998). The author would like to thank Professor A.G. Harmon for inspiring the topic, Professor
John Sharifi for aiding in its selection, Victoria Kawecki, Esq. for her expert advice, Vallyn L.
Merrick, M.S.Ed., family, and friends for their support. This Comment is dedicated in loving
memory to Karen Denise King, Ph.D.
1. ALTON LOGAN, JUSTICE FAILED xli (2016).
2. Id. at 11–15.
3. Id. at 29, 31–32. Two attorneys for an individual named Andrew Wilson (Dale Coventry
and Jaime Kunz) were approached by Marc Miller, attorney for Logan’s cellmate, Edgar Hope. Id.
at 29–30. Hope admitted to being an accomplice of Wilson and asserted that Wilson, not Logan,
was the perpetrator of the crime for which Logan was incarcerated. Id. at 29. After being
approached by Miller with this information, Coventry and Kunz interviewed Wilson at which time
Wilson admitted to the crime. Id. at 31–32.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 35. Kunz met with a judge who was a former defense attorney. The judge warned
that there was nothing to be done—and whether or not Logan faced the death penalty had no bearing
on the attorneys’ obligation to maintain privilege. Id.
6. Id. at 32–33, 39.
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in prison, narrowly escaping the death penalty by a 10-2 vote.7 The affidavit
remained sealed while Logan maintained his innocence in prison.8 On
November 19, 2007, Andrew Wilson died.9 On December 17, 2007, Alton
Logan’s attorney filed a motion to have the affidavit disclosed.10 Disclosure was
finally granted on January 11, 2008.11 This set in motion a series of events that
would lead to the full exoneration of Alton Logan. Alton Logan spent twentysix years in prison, convicted of a crime he didn’t commit.12 While Logan was
serving time, the documented confession that could have led to his exoneration
remained hidden for 25 years.13 According to the attorneys involved, they had
no choice but to remain silent.14 The duty of confidentiality required them to
keep their client’s secret.15
The conduct of lawyers is governed by the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).16 The rules are critical
to promoting a level of professionalism and continuity within the profession and
are designed to operate in tandem with an attorney’s duty to the administration
of justice.17 The rules are not laws.18 They are guidelines that, if followed, can

7. Id. at 43–45. In Illinois, at the time of the trial, the death penalty required a unanimous
vote of the jury. Id. at 45.
8. Id. at 50–51.
9. Id. at 73.
10. Id. at 77.
11. Id. at 79. The order, granting the motion and ruling that Wilson had waived the attorneyclient privilege, allowed Wilson’s attorneys to discuss the affidavit’s contents and Wilson’s
confession to the 1982 murder. Id. Wilson’s attorneys had also obtained oral permission from
Wilson to disclose the confession upon his death. Id. at 34.
12. See generally id. at 3 (Logan was arrested on February 7, 1982 at age twenty-eight, and
not freed until September 4, 2008, at age fifty-five).
13. The focus in the Logan case was on attorneys Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, to whom
Andrew Wilson confessed. Coventry and Kunz were not, however, the only individuals aware of
the confession. Two other attorneys learned of the confession during Logan’s incarceration and
signed the affidavit: Marc Miller, attorney for Logan’s cellmate Edgar Hope, and Andrea Lyon, a
public defender who made the initial recommendation to Coventry and Kunz that an affidavit be
drafted, “so that if Coventry and Kunz were ever to reveal the truth, it wouldn’t look like they made
up the story.” Id. at 32. Ms. Lyon also served as the notary on the document. Id. at 33.
14. 60 Minutes: 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison (CBS television broadcast May
23, 2008).
15. Id.
16. SUSAN R. MARTYN ET AL., THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: MODEL RULES,
STANDARDS, STATUTES, AND STATE LAWYER RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1 (2018).
17. Id. However, while the Rules are critical, they are voluntary and non-exhaustive. Id. at
9 (“Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon
understanding and voluntary compliance . . . The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer . . . The Rules simply provide a framework for
the ethical practice of law”).
18. David Rosenthal, The Criminal Defense Attorney, Ethics And Maintaining Client
Confidentiality: A Proposal to Amend Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 6 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 153, 153 (1993).
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prevent an attorney from facing professional discipline. Because the rules are
not laws, attorneys are often placed in a position where a decision must be made
that puts into conflict the legal ethics proscribed by the rules and the attorney’s
own moral obligation to seek justice.
This type of conflict arises in the interpretation of MRPC 1.6. Rule 1.6
outlines the attorney’s duty to keep the confidences of a client.19 It covers the
client relationship from initial interaction to disposition of a legal matter, and
the ongoing duty when a client’s status changes from current to former.20 Rule
1.6 requires that an attorney keep the confidences shared during client
representation at all times, with very few exceptions.21 Among these exceptions
is the “substantial bodily harm” exception, which is the focus of this Comment.22
This exception, found in the current iteration of MRPC 1.6(b)(1), allows an
attorney to breach the duty of confidentiality owed to a client “to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm . . . .”23 This rule is precatory. It gives the attorney the
option to decide if the circumstances warrant the breach.24
In 2017, “[a]t least 139 convicted defendants in the United States were
exonerated . . . .”25 Some of these exonerations were the result of the discovery
of “false confessions.”26 What these statistics lack, however, is an understanding
of the number of confessions that do not lead to exoneration because those
confessions were made as a part of the attorney-client relationship and therefore
kept confidential. MRPC 1.6 allows an attorney to disclose confidential
information if the disclosure falls under an exception.27 Some have argued that
wrongful incarceration is one such exception.
Incarceration in the United States exposes an inmate to substandard medical
care, a general lack of proper nutrition, the danger of inmate violence, and the
psychological and physiological damage of confinement.28 These factors,
19. See MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21–22.
20. Id. at 22, 26.
21. Id. at 21–22.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. MRPC Rule 1.6(b)(1) is the first exception to the duty of confidentiality outlined by
the rules. Id.
24. The rule uses the phrase “may reveal,” thus leaving the breach to the discretion of the
attorney. Id. Some state rules are mandatory, using the phrase “shall reveal” to require disclosure.
See generally Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_6.pdf [hereinafter Variations of the ABA Model Rules].
25. Niraj Chokshi, False Confessions, Mistaken Witnesses, Corrupt Investigators: Why 139
Innocent People Went to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
14/us/convict-exonerations-2017.html.
26. Id.
27. See MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21.
28. Zieva Dauber Konvisser, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction in Women
and the Possibility of Positive Change, 5 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 221, 244 (2012).
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compounded with the mental trauma of innocent imprisonment, result in
substantial harm.29 As of 2008, 26 states had adopted MRPC 1.6,30 however,
the general interpretation of the rule had not recognized wrongful incarceration
as substantial bodily harm.31 To date, only two states, Massachusetts and
Alaska, have codified a wrongful incarceration exception into their versions of
Rule 1.6.32 In the rest of the country, ethics committees responsible for attorney
discipline have been reluctant to read a wrongful incarceration exception into
the existing rule.
This Comment will posit that MRPC 1.6, in its current form, gives an attorney
the option to disclose a client confidence to help exonerate a third party. It will
provide historical context on the promulgation and evolution of Rule 1.6, and
support for the idea that the incarceration of the innocent causes substantial
bodily harm. The Comment will argue that, while two states have written a
wrongful incarceration exception into their equivalent laws, such a step is not
necessary because the existing rule should be interpreted to already encompass
wrongful incarceration.33 The Comment will give fair analysis to the challenges
of this interpretation, including the potential impact on the attorney-client
29. Id. at 238–39.
The trauma of wrongful conviction has been compared to the trauma suffered by
veterans of war, torture survivors, concentration camp survivors and refugees and asylees
who similarly have been arrested, wrongfully incarcerated and released back into
society—survivors of “‘sustained catastrophes’ that extend over long periods” and that
can change their lives—and the lives of their loved ones—forever. Once an individual
is isolated, interrogated, wrongfully convicted, imprisoned and released, his or her mental
health symptoms upon reentry are like those of torture survivors—anxiety, depression
and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Id.
30. Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be A Wrongful
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 391, 403 (2008) (noting that the following states have adopted a version of MRPC Rule
1.6(b)(1): Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin).
31. Id. at 392–93. The ABA rules were modified in 2002, adding the “substantial bodily
harm” exception, however this still hasn’t translated into the use of the exception for the purposes
of freeing the wrongfully incarcerated. Id.
32. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2, 13.
33.
Only one state—Massachusetts—has a wrongful incarceration exception in its
confidentiality rule: A lawyer may reveal [confidential information relating to the
representation of a client] to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or
in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, or to prevent the
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.
Victoria Vuletich, Is Property More Important Than People? The Moral Inadequacy of Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.6, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 187, 192–93 (2010). This changed in 2017
when Alaska added a similar statute. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2.
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relationship and overall public confidence in the legal profession; issues of
morality faced by attorneys in this particular scenario; the potential
constitutional issues derived from self-incrimination by the guilty client; and
matters of due process. The Comment will use an instructional hypothetical to
highlight the viability of a universal interpretation of Rule 1.6. Upon analysis
of this hypothetical, the Comment will conclude that Rule 1.6 provides the
language needed for attorneys and ethics committees to read wrongful
incarceration into the existing substantial bodily harm exception.
I. THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIAL
BODILY HARM
A. MRPC Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information
1. The Evolution of the Duty of Confidentiality
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are guidelines for attorney conduct.
Though these guidelines are not laws, attorneys hold them in high regard, often
giving them a “symbolic importance” that supersedes state ethics rules.34 The
rules were first promulgated in 1983 as an alternative to the Canons of Ethics
that were widely used as the exemplar of attorney behavior.35 The Canons of
Ethics were created at a time where public esteem of the legal profession was
low due to questions of ethics.36 Of critical concern were guidelines for lawyers
regarding client confidences.37 The Canons of Ethics were the first time a rule
regarding confidentiality was codified,38 yet the idea of its importance was not
a new one. In 1888, the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Blackburn noted
that:
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications
between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the
interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can

34. David Lew, Note, Revised Model Rule 1.6: What Effect Will the New Rule Have on
Practicing Attorneys?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 881, 887 (2005).
35. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 189. “The current version of MRPC 1.6 has its roots in the
comprehensive rewrite of the then-existing Canons of Ethics undertaken by the Kutak Commission
in 1977.” Id.
36. Gary Rowe, Potential Expansion, or Modification, to the Permissive Exceptions of Model
Rule 1.6: Client-Lawyer Confidentiality in Criminal Law and “The Gap”, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 291,
293 (2015).
37. Id.
38. Lew, supra note 34, at 882 (“The American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional
Ethics (‘Canons’) contained the nation’s first codified rule of confidentiality. The Canons, as
amended in 1928, stated that ‘it is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s confidences.’”).
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only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences
or the apprehension of disclosure.39
Rules regarding attorney-client confidentiality were primarily designed to
protect public confidence in the legal profession.40 This early focus on
maintaining confidentiality as integral to the success of the profession led to
strict, narrowly interpreted exceptions that existed for generations. It was
thought that the accused would not consent to legal services or maintain candor
with their attorney if there weren’t some safeguards that what was shared would
be kept in confidence.41 MRPC Rule 1.6 outlines the duty of confidentiality as
follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.42
Rule 1.6 holds confidences shared between a client and an attorney as
sacrosanct, and only provides limited exceptions for when a confidence can be
breached.43 Subsection (b)(1) of Rule 1.6 is one of those exceptions.44 This
exception has existed in varying forms in all iterations of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.45 In early versions of the rule, the information the
attorney was privy to had to be related to their client’s intent to commit a future
crime that would result in death or substantial bodily harm.46 This version of
the rule was first submitted for consideration by the American College of Trial
39. Hunt V. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). See also Patrick Santos, Comment, Why
the ABA Should Permit Lawyers to Use Their Get-out-of-Jail Free Card: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 151, 156 (2009) (discussing the importance of
confidentiality “[a]s early as 1888” when the Supreme Court decided Hunt v. Blackburn).
40. See Santos, supra note 39, at 156. In addition to preserving public confidence, legal
scholars have maintained that the duty of confidentiality builds client trust and that “the right to
counsel would be meaningless without the ability to communicate fully with one’s attorney, and
that that ability is contingent on the communications being protected.” Sarah Helene Sharp, On
Being a Blab or a Babbler: The Ethics and Propriety of Divulging Client Confidences 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 79, 81 (1997).
41. Sharp, supra note 40, at 81.
42. See MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21.
43. Id. at 21–22.
44. Id. at 21. See also Sharp, supra note 40, at 81 (discussing the exceptions to Rule 1.6).
45. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 192.
46. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005 99–100 (2006) [hereinafter A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The rule submitted by the Kutak Commission in 1982 did not include the
current substantial bodily harm exception. Id. Rather, the Kutak Commission rule only allowed
for disclosure to prevent a future crime on the part of the client that would result in death or
substantial bodily harm. Id. at 100.

2020]

Wrongful Incarceration Causes Substantial Bodily Harm

775

Lawyers (ACTL) in 1983.47 The submission was the end result of significant
debate where the ACTL attempted to “balance the sometimes competing
interests of lawyer, client and the public.”48 The ACTL firmly believed that
confidentiality should be maintained unless a breach could prevent a future
criminal act on the part of the client.49 The proposed rule was silent on past acts
and thus, by extension, silent on wrongful incarceration.50 In addition to the
requirement that the breach of confidentiality be to prevent a future crime or act,
there was also a requirement that the threat of death or substantial bodily harm
be imminent.51 During the course of debate on the 1983 amendments, several
bar associations and other legal entities proposed changes to Rule 1.6,
addressing “substantial bodily harm,” however these amendments all centered
on future acts: the prevention of a future crime was the sole basis for these
exceptions.52 In August 1983, after months of debate, the rule was formally
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates with the future crime caveat in place.53
At the time, the commission was simply unwilling to yield confidentiality to
rectify past harms, particularly if the attorney’s services were not used in any
way to facilitate such acts.54 The sole requirements (prevention of a future act
and imminence of the harm) for a breach of confidentiality remained in the final
version of the rules promulgated in 1983, and were unchanged until both were
removed in the 2002 amendments to the MRPC.55
2. The Modern Rule 1.6: A New Exception Offers Flexibility
In the year 2000, the ABA formed the Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, a working group that would later be called

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 105. The ABA Section of General Practice introduced a proposal at the 1983
meetings to allow attorneys to reveal confidences “when the lawyer reasonably believes that
divulgence is necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life.” Id. This language, again, did
not allow for a wrongful incarceration interpretation.
52. Id. at 106–08.
53. Id. at 109. The Commission’s comments to the rule revealed the rationale behind
maintaining the tenet of confidentiality, which the public relies on to maintain confidence in the
legal profession. Id. at 110.
54. Id. In 1991, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility once
again attempted to propose an amendment to Rule 1.6. Id. at 115. This amendment again focused
solely on future acts, or past acts where the attorney’s services had been used. Id. It was defeated.
Id. at 117.
55. Miller, supra note 30, at 394. “The 1983 version of the Model Rule remained unaltered
until the ABA Ethics Commission 2000 suggested removal of the ‘future criminal act’ and
imminence requirements from Rule 1.6(b)(1). The ABA accepted this recommendation and
amended Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002 . . . .” Id.
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‘Ethics 2000.’56 Upon completion, the Commission amended Rule 1.6 to its
current form.57 The Ethics 2000 Commission saw its 2002 changes to Rule 1.6
as among its most significant, choosing to highlight the changes in the
Chairperson’s Executive Summary.58 In that Summary, the Chair notes:
There has always been a tension between the goal of keeping inviolate
the client’s confidences and the need to give the lawyer the ability to
deal with situations where disclosure is necessary to protect third
parties or the legal system from substantial harm. The Commission is
proposing to broaden, in carefully circumscribed situations, the
grounds for discretionary disclosure of client information under Rule
1.6 . . . .59
The amended rule included a revised comment to articulate the purpose of the
new version of 1.6(b)(1) and how it addresses the conflict between
confidentiality and the public interest.60 In making these changes, the
Commission also sought to better align with Section 66 of the American Law
Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.61 That section provides
the clearest support for interpreting the rule to cover wrongful imprisonment,
stating that “[s]erious bodily harm within the meaning of the Section [66]
includes life-threatening illness and injuries and the consequences of events such
as imprisonment for a substantial period . . . .”62 The Restatement outlines the

56. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xi (2000) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT].
57. Id. at 164–70. The Ethics 2000 commission met over an almost forty month period to
review the rules and suggest changes in an open and transparent process. Id. at xii. A majority
vote was needed to effectuate the changes, but this was not done without “39 days of [open]
meetings . . . eight public hearings[,]” and plenty of opportunities for public comment. Id. Key
participants were members of the Advisory Council, comprised of over 250 legal professionals. Id.
“Although Ethics 2000 was tasked with updating the Model Rules in their entirety, Ethics 2000
‘addressed head-on one of the most frequently criticized aspects of the Model Rules—their narrow
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.’” Amanda Vance & Randi Wallach, Note, Updating
Confidentiality: An Overview of the Recent Changes to Model Rule 1.6, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1003, 1005 (2004).
58. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at xiv.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 166. Here we find language that supports the use of the information to protect the
wrongfully convicted/incarcerated without adding a separate, explicit exception. Comment six
posits that:
Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and
permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered
imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such
harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.
Id.
61. Id. at 171.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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duty of a lawyer to protect human life, even when such protections require a
breach of confidentiality.63
A review of the scholarship on the duty of confidentiality indicates a concern
for breaches of confidentiality that may implicate a client in a crime—as those
breaches can run afoul of a client’s constitutional rights. The Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution protects citizens against self-incrimination.64
In the context of a client’s confession to their attorney, the due process rights of
the Fifth Amendment are paramount.65 A citizen is not required to confess to a
crime, nor is an attorney required to advise a client to do so.66 This creates an
issue in cases involving the revelation of a client confession to help exonerate
another. To address this issue, for example, the Massachusetts version of Rule
1.6 includes a caveat that a confession can be used to help exonerate another.
However, the Massachusetts rule does not address if such a confession is
admissible at a subsequent trial should the confessing party later be charged with
the subject crime.67 Another tenet of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is due
process. Courts have used both the confessing client’s right to due process under
the law and the presumption that the wrongly incarcerated received due process
at trial to support an attorney’s decision to keep a client confession confidential,
even in instances where another individual is incarcerated for the crime.68 One
final question is whether a client’s rights, with respect to a confession, survive
death. As one observer has argued:
There should be no absolute duty to maintain client confidences
when representation has terminated because of the client’s death. In
63. Id. § 66 cmt. b (commenting that “[t]he exception recognized by this Section [66] is based
on the overriding value of life and physical integrity”). Different from the modern rule of the
MRPC, the Restatement went so far as to apply the exception to any confidential information, even
if it was not related to the representation of a client, or the act of a client. Id. § 66 cmt. a. “In all
such events, the ultimate threat is the same, and its existence suffices to warrant a lawyer’s taking
corrective steps to prevent the threatened death or serious bodily harm.” Id. § 66 cmt. b.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65. See People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 189 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1975), aff’d 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y.
1976). “[T]he client’s Fifth Amendment rights cannot be violated by his attorney . . . [t]he criminal
defendant’s self-incrimination rights become completely nugatory if compulsory disclosure can be
exacted through his attorney.” Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 164.
66. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Confession For The Soul?: A Lawyer’s Moral Advice to a Guilty
Client About Saving an Innocent Defendant, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 219 (2012).
67. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 13.
68. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 169 (commenting that in Herrera v. Collins, the Court
“suggested that if a person, whether innocent or not, has been accorded procedural due process the
Supreme Court will not block an execution”). In Herrera v. Collins, the opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist showed deference to the proceedings of the lower court where there is a presumption
that a defendant was given a fair trial. 506 U.S. 390, 407 (1993). Based on this presumption, the
Court justified an attorney’s choice to keep a confession confidential, despite the incarceration of
another. Id. at 396. This case was particularly important on the matter, because it was a capital
punishment case. Id. at 394. Here, despite the possibility that a prisoner would be executed for a
crime to which another has confessed; the Court was unwilling to absolve the attorney of the duty
of confidentiality.
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this instance, it is axiomatic that the attorney cannot impinge upon the
client’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights . . . An attorney should not
have to risk the freedoms of a living human being for the sake of a
decedent’s name and bounty. Therefore, for example, an attorney
should be at liberty to reveal a client’s confession when another
individual’s rights are at stake, even if this might harm the decedent’s
reputation or expose the estate to civil liability.69
However, courts have repeatedly held that attorneys are not to reveal deceased
client’s confessions, even in situations where such a disclosure could free an
incarcerated individual.70 Attorneys are still required to obtain informed consent
(to the confidentiality breach).71
B. Defining Substantial Bodily Harm
The substantial bodily harm exception allows a lawyer to breach
confidentiality in an effort to “prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm.”72 The MRPC defines substantial bodily harm as that which “will
be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person
will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action . . . .”73 This
differs slightly from prior iterations of the rule that required an imminence
standard, using the concept of reasonable certainty. The comments to Rule 1.6
clarify the intent behind the language “reasonably certain,” and why it is not a
complete departure from the prior imminence standard, explaining that “‘harm’
is ‘reasonably certain’ when it is either ‘imminent’ (i.e., temporally close) or
when failure to disclose will irreversibly set into motion a chain of events that
could end in death or substantial bodily harm.”74 These modifications to the
rule, broadening the definition of what could be considered substantial bodily
harm, laid the foundation for the modern debate on the application the
“substantial bodily harm” exception to wrongful incarceration.75
The ABA’s 2002 amendments to Model Rule 1.6 opened a crack in
the doctrinal wall, but a modest one. Now, a lawyer would be
permitted to reveal client information when necessary to prevent
certain future harms as well as crimes. Execution is plainly a future

69. Sharp, supra note 40, at 85.
70. Id. at 83.
71. See MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21 (noting that MRPC Rule 1.6 requires that informed
consent is given prior to revealing a client confidence, unless the confidence falls under one of the
specific exceptions enumerated in the rule).
72. MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21.
73. Id. at 23. See also Vuletich, supra note 33, at 193 (discussing the standards of the
“substantial bodily harm” exception).
74. Miller, supra note 30, at 395.
75. James E. Moliterno, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer Reveal Her Client’s
Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction of Another, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811, 812
(2011).
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harm. But what of non-capital, wrongful convictions? Is the presence
of the wrongly convicted in prison such a future harm? In particular,
is the wrongly convicted “reasonably certain” to suffer “substantial
bodily harm?”76
1. The Substantial Bodily Harm of Incarceration
Massachusetts and Alaska have codified a wrongful incarceration exception
into their versions of Rule 1.6.77 By doing so, the versions of the rule adopted
by these states recognize that the effects of incarceration on the human body are
substantial.78 The National Institutes of Health has defined “prisons as ‘toxic
environments’ with a negative impact on inmate health.”79 There have been
multiple social and physical determinants of health identified.80 Among these
determinants, natural environment, social support, resources, and equitable
healthcare access can all be negatively affected by incarceration. There is a
wealth of research into the physical and physiological effects of incarceration.
Prisoners suffer from “higher rates of communicable disease, chronic illness and
physical impairment” than the general population.81 In addition to these extreme
issues, “there is a broader public health concern . . . the long-term health
consequences of forcing incarcerated people to consume unhealthy food.”82
76. Id.
77. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2, 13.
78. States that have codified this exception invariably recognize the ABA’s view that public
interest and “the overriding value of life and physical integrity” outweigh client trust. MARTYN,
supra note 16, at 23; Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful
Incarceration, 23 CRIM. JUST. 46, 49 (2008).
79. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, HEALTH AND INCARCERATION: A WORKSHOP
SUMMARY (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK201966/ [hereinafter NIH HEALTH
AND INCARCERATION]. In making the point that prisons are environments detrimental to health,
NIH has gone on to say that:
[S]ome prison environments “are so inhospitable that it is impossible to deliver effective
medical and mental health care.” Citing particularly the “two extremes of confinement:
hopelessly overcrowded prison systems and conditions of long-term segregation or
isolation,” [an expert] argued that the norms, policies, culture, and even architecture of
prisons can worsen health problems among the ill, and even generate problems among
the healthy. Thus, it simply “becomes impossible to effectively deliver treatment in those
kinds of environments.”
Id.
80. Social Determinants of Health, OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/social-determinants-of-health (last
visited October 24, 2020).
81. Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of
Incarceration on Health, 48 J. OF HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 116 (2007).
82. See generally Food for Thought: Prison Food is a Public Health Problem, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/03/03/prison-food/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2020). In addition to these issues,
[i]ncarcerated people are at increased risk of chronic diseases, but rather than using Food
Services to help control both health problems and the costs of medical treatment, prisons
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Health issues facing prisoners also include mental health concerns.83 “The
experience of being locked in a cage has a psychological effect upon everyone
made to endure it. No one leaves unscarred.”84 Researchers have found that
inmates suffer from a variety of mental health conditions, including, but not
limited, to paranoia, depression, and other psycho-social disorders.85 Despite
this, the statistics are alarming:
Among state and federal inmates, only 60% of those in need reported
receiving treatment while incarcerated. Half said they had received
prescription medication, and 44% received counseling or therapy.
Roughly one-quarter reported being admitted overnight to a mental
hospital or treatment program. Among those in local jails, only 41%
of those with mental illness received any form of treatment. Of those
receiving treatment, one-third had been given medication, and only
16% had received counseling or therapy while in jail.86
Critical to accepting the hypothesis that substantial harm to the psyche equals
substantial harm to the body is the recognition that mental illness is a disease of
the body.87 The notion that illnesses of the mind exist in a realm beyond that of
physical science has long been debunked. Therefore, any discussion of the
effects of incarceration on the body of the inmate must include the impact to the
brain, and the psyche by extension. First, adjustment to incarceration generally
causes irreparable psychological harm.88 As a prison sentence continues,
“[p]rolonged exposure to stress leaves the body in a heightened state of
awareness that ultimately taxes the cardiovascular and immune systems. This
leaves individuals at increased risk for both mental and physical health
problems.”89 This increased risk, caused by the effects of incarceration is

exacerbate illnesses by serving and selling unhealthy foods. Half of all incarcerated
people in state and federal prisons report having had a chronic illness and are ‘potentially
at risk for future medical problems.’ Nearly as many—40%—report a current chronic
condition.
Id. See also NIH HEALTH AND INCARCERATION, supra note 79.
83. NIH HEALTH AND INCARCERATION, supra note 79.
84. Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 257, 257 (2013).
85. Id. at 259.
86. Joyce Kosak, Comment, Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 399 (2005).
87. What is Mental Illness?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/patientsfamilies/what-is-mental-illness (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
88. Konvisser, supra note 28, at 241. Research into the psychological effects of incarceration
note that, from the very start of a prison sentence, the initial indoctrination into prison life and
culture is beset with mental health triggers. Id.
89. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 278 (2008).
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irreversible.90 While the stressors of incarceration differ from those after
release, “the totality of the incarceration experience—from fear or isolation
while incarcerated to labor market and family problems that released inmates
face—may fundamentally alter an individual’s ability to effectively regulate
health functioning.”91
2. The Unique Harm Caused by Wrongful Incarceration92
The effects of wrongful incarceration on the physical and mental health of an
inmate can be devastating:
The experience of being incarcerated can have long-lasting effects
on all inmates, including relationship difficulties, concerns with
physical and psychological deterioration, the indeterminate nature of
sentences and the prison environment itself. All prisoners must learn
to cope with imprisonment and the harsh conditions of prison
standards and health care, solitary confinement, sexual abuse, and
violence; however, the impact of imprisonment on the wrongfully
convicted goes beyond that experienced by other long-term
prisoners.93
Research on the health effects of incarceration often excludes the unique
challenges faced by the innocent.94 Prisoners who know they did not commit
the crime for which they are incarcerated experience a trauma that has been
likened to that experienced by combat veterans and others in high-impact, highstress life events.95 There is a distinct mental and physical toll inherent to the
experience:

90. Id. “More recently it has become clear that severe or chronic stress can fundamentally
alter the body and permanently alter and weaken its ability to respond to additional stressors. That
is, the body’s ability to maintain health is permanently damaged.” Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Between 1989 and 2017, over 2,000 people in America have been designated as
wrongfully convicted. MARK GODSEY, BLIND INJUSTICE: A FORMER PROSECUTOR EXPOSES THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 5 (2017).
93. Konvisser, supra note 28, at 248.
94. Id. at 224. “There is a dearth of knowledge on the life-long implications, psychological
impact and consequences of wrongful conviction on the innocent individuals themselves.” Id.
Although a number of researchers have studied the impact of long-term
imprisonment . . . few have studied the impact of detention on prisoners who are
wrongfully convicted. In addition to being punished for crimes that they did not commit,
the wrongfully imprisoned can expect to experience the standard adverse psychological
symptoms attendant to being detained for many years, separated from loved ones, and
divorced from any sense of autonomy.
Leslie Scott, It Never, Ever Ends: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Conviction, 5 CRIM. L.
BRIEF 10, 13 (2009).
95. Konvisser, supra note 28, at 238–39, 250–51. See also Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo,
One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After A Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 825, 836–37 (2010) (“[T]hose released following wrongful conviction and
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For many people who are wrongfully convicted, being arrested for a
crime they did not commit is just the first in a series of tragic events .
. . such events merely set the stage for what happens after the joyous
day when an innocent prisoner is finally exonerated and released . . . .
That is when they face the consequences of the inadequate medical
and mental health care they received while incarcerated.96
Another indicator of the effect of incarceration is re-integration. The
challenge of re-integration is profound for any prisoner upon release. Mental
health and social reintegration services are scarce for exonerees, who frequently
“get the worst of both worlds—the stigma of prison, with none of the support
services available to those who have served time.”97 As exonerees attempt to
navigate a world that has undoubtedly changed, many succumb to the weight of
the experience.98 One study conducted in 2000 on recently exonerated subjects
revealed “[s]ubstantial psychiatric morbidity and problems of psychological and

imprisonment may have significant psychiatric and adjustment difficulties of the kind described in
other groups of people who have suffered chronic psychological trauma.”).
96. Matthew Clarke, Tragic Justice: Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners Die Shortly After
Exoneration, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2017/mar/9/tragic-justice-wrongfully-convicted-prisoners-die-shortly-after-exoneration.
97. Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide
Fair Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 11, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2020).
98. Clarke, supra note 97. Several anecdotal accounts of untimely death after a wrongful
incarceration have been documented by Prison Legal News. See generally id. Cases of note
include:
Sharif Wilson: incarcerated at age eighteen, spent almost twenty years in prison before being
exonerated by new DNA evidence. Id. Wilson had no inherent health problems prior to his
incarceration; however, upon release he was morbidly obese. Id. Eleven months after his release,
Wilson died of an asthma attack. Id.
William Lopez: incarcerated for over twenty-three years before being exonerated because an
eyewitness, the foundation of the prosecution’s case, recanted. Id. Lopez died nineteen months
after his release, just one day before his lawsuit against the City of New York was to go to trial. Id.
Timothy Howard: incarcerated for twenty-six years before being exonerated after suppressed
evidence was uncovered. Id. Howard died of a massive heart attack four years after his release.
Id.
Glenn Ford: incarcerated for almost thirty years on death row before being exonerated and
released. Id. Ford died of lung cancer fifteen months later. Id.
Bobby Rae Dixon: incarcerated for over 30 years before being exonerated by DNA evidence. Id.
Dixon died of cancer just one month before his scheduled release. Id. One of his co-defendants
(also cleared) died in prison nine years before exoneration. Id. The final co-defendant died four
years after release. Id.
In sum, “[w]hether their deaths were due to poor medical care while incarcerated, the stress of the
injustice of their wrongful convictions, or accidents or other causes, all of these exonerees were
victims of a broken criminal justice system that robbed them of their freedom and, ultimately, their
lives.” Id.
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social adjustment.”99
These problems can often manifest in strained
interpersonal relationships, difficulties maintaining intimacy, and prolonged
periods of social withdrawal.100 Compounding these challenges are difficulties
with financial security upon release.101 Financial security has a direct impact on
health. The ability to provide for one’s personal needs, in tandem with any
family obligations, is critical to a sense of well-being. While there are programs
that exist to assist former inmates with meeting the challenges of re-entry, these
programs are often closed to exonerees.102
3. Legal Challenges Reveal the True Harm of Wrongful Incarceration
a. George Reissfelder103
In a case made famous by then-future Presidential Candidate John Kerry’s
involvement, George Reissfelder was exonerated after fifteen years in prison for
first degree murder.104 The actual perpetrator of the crime confessed to his
attorney ten years prior, but the attorney did not reveal the confession due to
attorney-client privilege.105 Despite the fact that the perpetrator confessed on
his death bed, and was therefore deceased at the time when disclosure was
sought, the judge hearing the case to disclose denied the motion, preventing
Reissfelder’s freedom until a confidentiality waiver was provided by the
perpetrator’s estate.106
99. Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME &
JUST. 1, abstract (2005). Significant mental health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
adjustment issues, depression, and personality changes, were prevalent. Id. at 2. The author notes
through his research that a correlation has been accepted between trauma and clinical symptoms,
positing that there are four features that determine the link:
First, they seem incomprehensible: they threaten the individual’s basic assumptions
about himself and his world. Second, they rupture attachments to others, and subsequent
long-term difficulties in forming relationships are common. Third, the traumatic
situation is inescapable and overwhelming. Fourth, traumatic events cause extreme
physiological arousal leading to a persistent hypervigilance and sense of threat. These
features also characterized the experiences described by the wrongly convicted men.
Id. at 41.
100. Id. at 22.
101. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 98, at 15–19.
102. Gillian B. White, Taxing the Wrongfully Convicted, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/taxing-the-wrongfullyconvicted/470397
(exonerated individuals are frequently disqualified from traditional re-entry programs and left
“entirely on their own, with no guidance for finding jobs or housing, or even transportation”). In
addition to the lack of social services, exonerees are not guaranteed any official monetary restitution
for their time served, and many states do not have compensation statutes for people who have been
wrongfully convicted. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 98, at 15–19.
103. Sullivan v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1023, 1027 n.3 (1st Cir. 1970) (quoting the indictment that
charged George Reissfelder with the murder of Michael Shaw).
104. Miller, supra note 30, at 392.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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b. Lee Wayne Hunt107
In 1986, Lee Wayne Hunt was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to life in prison.108 Hunt’s co-defendant, who was also serving a life sentence,
committed suicide in 2002.109 Upon his death, his attorney petitioned the court
to disclose a confession he received from the co-defendant in 1985 (prior to the
conviction) that he had acted alone and Hunt was not involved in the murder.110
At the hearing, the judge denied the motion, citing the North Carolina Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and threatened the attorney with referral to the
state bar for discipline if the confession was revealed.111 It is important to note
that, in this case, the attorney “ignored the judge’s admonition. The judge
refused to accept [the attorney’s] testimony, ruling that [he] was guilty of
professional misconduct . . . .”112 Lee Wayne Hunt died in prison, having served
33 years of a life sentence.113
c. William Macumber114
William Macumber was convicted of double murder in Arizona in 1972 at the
age of 40, sentenced to two consecutive life terms.115 Macumber appealed his
conviction and, on appeal, it was revealed that a deceased client had confessed
to his two attorneys that he had committed the crime for which Macumber was
incarcerated.116 The trial judge denied the motion to admit evidence of the
confession, commenting that attorney-client privilege survives the death of the

107. Hunt v. Jones, 692 F. App’x 723, 724 (4th Cir. 2017).
108. LOGAN, supra note 1, at 136.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 136–37.
112. Id. at 137.
113. Martha Waggoner, Confession Failed to Free NC Man, Who Has Died as a Prisoner,
ABC 13 NEWS (April 10, 2019), http://www.wlos.com/news/local/confession-failed-to-free-ncman-who-has-died-as-a-prisoner.
114. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Ariz. 1976).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1086.

2020]

Wrongful Incarceration Causes Substantial Bodily Harm

785

client.117 While Macumber was eventually freed, his exoneration was not based
on the client confession.118
C. Codification of a Wrongful Incarceration Exception: Massachusetts &
Alaska
Before the MRPC was adopted, an alternative to Rule 1.6 was proposed which
allowed confidentiality to “yield to the duty to protect human life. [The]
proposal specifically asserted that ‘a lawyer may reveal a client’s confidence
when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes that divulgence is
necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life.’”119 To directly address
the subject harm, Massachusetts and Alaska have written wrongful incarceration
exceptions into their versions of Rule 1.6.120 These exceptions recognize the
harm associated with incarceration, and the disparate impact of these harms on
the innocent, while still acknowledging the sanctity of confidentiality.121 The
wording of the exception does not alter the rest of the existing rule, keeping all
other safeguards of confidentiality in place. The simple addition of the phrase
“or wrongful execution or incarceration of another” is all that is required.122
Some argue that “[t]he ABA needs to make a clear determination in MRPC 1.6,
as Massachusetts [and Alaska] ha[ve] done, as to whether an innocent person’s
wrongful incarceration is a tolerable ‘cost of justice’ that supports the principles
underlying attorney-client confidentiality.”123 In formulating Massachusetts’
117. Id. In this matter, Macumber was granted a new trial due to additional evidence that was
discovered, unrelated to the client confession. Id. at 1087. In an important concurrence to the
ruling, Justice Holohan noted:
When the client died there was no chance of prosecution for other crimes, and any
privilege is merely a matter of property interest. Opposed to the property interest of the
deceased client is the vital interest of the accused in this case in defending himself against
the charge of first degree murder. When the interests are weighed, I believe that the
constitutional right of the accused to present a defense should prevail over the property
interest of a deceased client in keeping his disclosures private. I would allow the
defendant to offer the testimony of the attorneys concerning the confession of their
deceased client.
Id. at 1088. Here, the death of the client was still required by the bench to warrant disclosure,
despite the incarceration of an innocent man.
118. Richard Ruelas, William Macumber, Arizona Inmate Freed After 37 Years, Dies in Prison,
ARIZ. CENT. (Jan. 10, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
scottsdale/2017/01/10/william-macumber-arizona-inmate-freed-dies-prison/96406122/.
119. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 169.
120. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2, 13. The Massachusetts and
Alaska exceptions are nearly identical, simply allowing disclosure to prevent “the wrongful
execution or incarceration of another” in addition to the existing exceptions of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Id.
121. See MASS. R. PRO. CONDUCT 1.6 cmt. 6. The Massachusetts version of MRPC 1.6
acknowledges that it is in the public interest to maintain rules of confidentiality, but also
“recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.” Id.
122. See Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2, 10.
123. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 194.
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version of the rule, the committee noted that this was not a tolerable cost.124
While some dissented during the adoption of the Massachusetts rule, fifteen
years after its implementation supporters of the rule noted that there has been no
documented negative impact of the rule on the perception of attorney-client
confidentiality.125
In states where such an explicitly worded exception has not been adopted,
there are generally four ways state versions of the MRPC address this provision.
States either match their rule to the current iteration of MRPC 1.6(b)(1), modify
to make the disclosure mandatory, limit disclosure to prevention of a future act
on the part of the client, or eliminate the provision entirely.126
II. MRPC RULE 1.6 (B)(1) PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION FOR WRONGFUL
INCARCERATION
A. Two Approaches to the Interpretation of Rule 1.6(b)(1)
There are two distinct approaches used by the states in relations to a wrongful
incarceration exception to Rule 1.6. These approaches are best described as
Traditional and Revised.127 Traditional states have adopted the ABA version of
Rule 1.6 and do not read the rule to include an exception for wrongful
incarceration.128 Revised states, Massachusetts and Alaska, have codified the
interpretation of Rule 1.6 that allows for disclosure in the event of wrongful
incarceration by directly adding that language to their versions of the rule.129
124. MASSACHUSETTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
REPORT
A-1
(2013),
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1718&context=lsfp [hereinafter MASS. ADVISORY COMMITTEE] (noting that the goal of allowing
disclosure was “to prevent harm to third parties”). Massachusetts removed the “future act”
restriction, as well as the requirement that the lawyer’s services be used in some way to effectuate
the harm. Id.
125. Id. The advisory committed noted that “[a]lthough our version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) has been
in effect for fifteen years, the dissenting members offer no empirical evidence that the Rule’s
permission to disclose confidential information has been abused or that attorney-client
confidentiality has been eroded.” Id.
126. See generally Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24. As of January 2, 2020,
a majority of states have adopted the current version of MRPC 1.6(b)(1). Id. Fourteen states have
adopted a variation of current version, but changed “may” to “must” or “shall,” making the
attorney’s action mandatory. Id. Twenty-two states have a version of MRPC 1.6(b)(1) that only
allows the attorney to disclose in order to prevent a client’s future crime or act that is likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm. Id. A few states have eliminated exception (b)(1) entirely,
while Alaska and Massachusetts have directly written “wrongful incarceration” into their respective
versions of the rule. Id. Finally, North Carolina has the broadest version of Rule 1.6(b)(1), opting
to drop the word “substantial,” and allowing an attorney to disclose in order to prevent “reasonably
certain death or bodily harm.” Id. at 19.
127. MASS. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 125, at A-14 (contrasting the Massachusetts
approach with the traditional approach of the dissenters).
128. See, e.g., Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that Delaware
adopted MRPC 1.6 without any changes).
129. Id. at 2, 13.
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1. The Traditional Approach
States that have maintained a traditional approach to the rule hold that
confidentiality supersedes all other third party considerations.130 Knowledge of
a third party’s incarceration for a crime a client has confessed to has no bearing
on the confidentiality rules; there is no exception that is interpreted to allow
disclosure.131 In these states, disclosure becomes a question of morality, not the
model rules. “[E]vidence suggests that lawyers do not base their decisions on
whether or not to disclose confidential information primarily upon adherence to
ethical rules, but rather, upon their previously formulated notions of right and
wrong.”132 Thus, considerations of individual morality play a role in decision
making regarding confidentiality.
Most systems of morality would likely dictate that a guilty person
should confess to save an innocent person from being convicted. On
the other hand, one might argue that the guilty person has no moral
obligation to correct a problem with the justice system that allowed
the innocent defendant to be convicted . . . . The guilty client’s
dilemma also raises moral issues for the attorney who knows that an
innocent person is going to prison.133
Many perceive the MRPC as devoid of moral quandaries, but this may not be
true in matters of confidentiality. “[T]he Model Rules were developed and
promulgated in an effort to achieve moral neutrality in governing attorney
behavior. However, moral neutrality in the realm of client confidentiality is not
crystallized within the framework of the Model Rules.”134 While it is accurate
that the MRPC does not directly take up the issue of morality, the precatory
nature of the substantial bodily harm exception leaves the ultimate decision in
the hands of the attorney.135 These moral dilemmas that attorneys face are
compounded by other sections of the MRPC that seem to allow disclosure of a
client confidence when the stakes are much lower than the life of an innocent

130. See Lew, supra note 34, at 884.
131. J. Vincent Aprile II, Confidential Information and Wrongful Convictions, 25 CRIM. JUST.
50, 50–51 (2010). See also Joy & McMunigal, supra note 78, at 48 (discussing multiple cases
where courts have used “attorney-client privilege to prevent lawyer[s] from testifying about
deceased client[] statements that may have exonerated [a] defendant”); see, e.g., State v. Valdez,
618 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1980); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (S.C. 1981); Morales v.
Portunondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 729–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
132. Lew, supra note 34, at 885.
133. Kirchmeier, supra note 66, at 221 (expanding on the concept that by confessing to one’s
attorney, the defendant puts a burden on the attorney that is unique because it puts the attorney’s
obligations to the client, the justice system, and society at large in direct conflict).
134. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 158–59.
135. Id. at 160–61 (explaining that “attorneys still have moral obligations to society and to
themselves”). While the MRPC guides conduct and is not explicit on morality, the ultimate
decision to disclose a confidence rests within that particular attorney’s conscience. See id.
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person.136 On the issue of morality and the MRPC it is also important to note
that because the rules are not laws, the decision to keep a client confidence is
one of maintaining a professional license and avoiding sanction by an ethical
review or disciplinary board.137 “Thus, an attorney faces a Hobson’s choice
between: (1) doing the morally right thing of disclosing client confidences in
situations of wrongful incarceration, with the significant possibility that doing
so will buy an attorney a possible professional discipline or malpractice claim,
or (2) doing nothing.”138
2. The Revised Approach
Massachusetts and Alaska have recognized wrongful incarceration to be
substantial bodily harm and have codified that belief into their versions of
MRPC 1.6.139 The rules in these states have been in place for over fourteen
years, yet there is no evidence of attorneys using them to help exonerate
someone wrongfully convicted of a crime.140 One can infer from this data that
there still exists a reluctance on the part of attorneys to breach confidentiality;
however, the exception provides an option that did not exist in prior versions of
the rule. For those who believe that such an exception erodes public confidence
in the legal system, there exists strong evidence to the contrary. There has been
no “empirical evidence that these varied exceptions to the confidentiality rule in
effect over the years have undermined the basic principle of lawyer-client
confidentiality or eroded clients’ trust in lawyers.”141 Opponents to the revised
approach often raise questions of the utility of a lawyer coming forward with
information obtained from a client.142 While it is correct that there may be

136. Sharp, supra note 40, at 82 (commenting that there are rules that allow an attorney to
breach confidentiality when a client is using the attorney’s services in a way that advances or assists
in the commission of a fraud). The other rules allowing breach of confidentiality imply that saving
the lawyer’s own reputation, income, or license is paramount to saving the life of another human
being. Other exceptions to confidentiality rules—including MRPC 1.6(b)(2)–(5), and 1.6(b)(7)—
seem to suggest that if the attorney is not directly involved, then the confidence must be kept.
MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21–22. All of these exceptions only apply when the attorney is in some
way directly involved in the actions of the client. Id.
137. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 194.
138. Id.
139. Variations of the ABA Model Rules, supra note 24, at 2, 13.
140. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 78, at 47 (stating that there were no examples of an attorney
disclosing confidential information under the Massachusetts rule in the first six years since its
inception).
141. MASS. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 125, at A-3.
142. See Richard E. Myers II, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Client Confessions and Wrongful
Convictions: Immunity as a Statutory Solution, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101, 103–05 (2018)
(discussing a proposal by which a lawyer in possession of confidential information from a client
can use that information in proceedings to exonerate another without compromising the
representation of their own client, through the use of immunity). Lawyers, armed with information
that may exonerate another, still have the hurdle of having that evidence admitted in some
proceeding that can affect the incarcerated individual. See id. at 104.

2020]

Wrongful Incarceration Causes Substantial Bodily Harm

789

evidentiary hurdles to using the client’s confession in court, “one can argue that
revelation of the confession may produce benefits other than its use as evidence
in a court proceeding. The revelation might help a wrongfully charged or
convicted person attract public support, lead to other admissible evidence, or
simply prompt the prosecution to reexamine a case.”143
B. Two Approaches, One Interpretation: Wrongful Incarceration as
Substantial Bodily Harm
MRPC Rule 1.6 permits an attorney to reveal a client confidence to prevent
harm to another person.144 Comment Six to the rule provides a hypothetical to
illustrate the intended use of the provision and can be extended to encompass
wrongful incarceration.145 In the hypothetical, the commission proposes that if
the lawyer is made aware that their client allowed toxic waste to infiltrate the
town’s water supply, the lawyer can reveal this information “if there is a present
and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a lifethreatening or debilitating disease . . . .”146
Extending this line of reasoning to a wrongful incarceration scenario, we find
that in an instance of wrongful incarceration we are closer, not further from the
lawyer preventing harm by revealing a confidence. In the water example, you
have to assume that a) the toxic waste was significant enough to cause physical
harm, b) the harm would be experienced by anyone coming into contact with the
water, c) the harm would be substantial, and d) other mitigating factors could
not affect the occurrence of the harm (medications, genetic adaptation, water
filtration, etc.). In a wrongful incarceration scenario, the same level of mental
gymnastics simply is not necessary: a) Is someone incarcerated for a crime your
client committed? b) Does imprisonment alone expose an individual to
substantial bodily harm? c) Is that harm worse for the wrongfully incarcerated?
Answering yes to these three questions seems to comport with the intent of Rule
1.6.147
One difficulty with construing the exception to apply to wrongful
incarceration can be found in the triggering standard, “reasonable certainty.”
While some argue that “[n]o one can predict with reasonable certainty that an
inmate will suffer harm ‘imminently’ and whether the harm will be ‘substantial
bodily injury[,]’” data on the general effects of incarceration on prisoners
provides valuable insight.148 To date, while some cases have argued that
wrongful incarceration falls under this exception, these cases have largely
143. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 78, at 48.
144. MARTYN, supra note 16, at 21.
145. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 166.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 193 (noting that even though the proposition that inmates face
increased risk of harm may be “common sense, it does not meet the ‘reasonably certain’” threshold
required by the exception).
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centered around preventing the reasonably certain death of a prisoner sentenced
to the death penalty.149 Outside of the certainty and finality of execution, there
is limited scholarship on the concept of incarceration alone equaling substantial
bodily harm.150 Another challenge to the assertion that wrongful incarceration
causes substantial bodily harm is the prevalence of literature on the topic that
has isolated the harm of incarceration to three distinct factors: exposure to
communicable diseases, sexual assault, and inmate violence.151 Because these
three factors are not guaranteed to be a part of every inmate’s experience, a focus
on these factors alone widens the gap between wrongful incarceration and
substantial bodily harm. The issue with this approach is that it is possible for a
prisoner to be incarcerated for an extended period of time, wrongfully or not,
and not contract a communicable disease or fall victim to sexual assault or
inmate violence. Because of this possibility, judges and tribunals have been
reluctant to read a wrongful incarceration exception into the rule.152 Thus, “[i]n
any state other than Massachusetts [or Alaska], an attorney disclosing client
confidences to rectify wrongful incarceration may later be [disciplined] for
violating MRPC 1.6 or be held liable for malpractice by a judge or jury that does
not agree that wrongful incarceration equals ‘reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.’”153 Instead of isolating the harm of incarceration to
these three factors, it is critical to look at the totality of the inmate experience to
effectively evaluate the impact on heath.154 Incarceration in the United States
149. See id. at 191. In the Alton Logan case, for example, attorneys Coventry and Kunz
indicated that their handling of the confession may have been different if Logan was facing the
death penalty. Id. The Illinois version of Rule 1.6, in place at the time of Logan’s conviction,
included an exception for death or serious bodily harm, which encompasses execution. Id.
150. See Massoglia, supra note 90, at 275. Most research on the health effects of incarceration
focuses on statistics and literature that point to prison violence, sexual assault, and the prevalence
of communicable diseases. Id. “Little research . . . examines exposure to the penal system as an
explanatory factor in health outcomes . . . .” Id.
To the extent that research has examined the health consequences of incarceration,
the focus has been on the rather immediate impact of prisons on health outcomes such as
suicide, depression, and coping or problems that impact a relatively small percentage of
the population such as severe health limitations. Emerging work has considered how
incarceration may contribute to patterns of HIV infections.
Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
151. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 30, at 396–97. This presents an issue for attorneys who
attempt to use exposure to the penal system generally as an example of “substantial bodily harm”
to meet the standard of the exception. Arguments using this approach do not hold up to
judicial/ethics committee scrutiny because of the counterargument that every prisoner does not
directly encounter prison violence, sexual assault or a communicable disease. Therefore, revealing
the confidence would not automatically prevent ‘substantial bodily harm.’
152. See Vuletich, supra note 33, at 193–94. “[T]he rule provides no guidance whatsoever to
attorneys hoping to construe a wrongful incarceration exception into MRPC 1.6. As it stands, only
a tenuous argument can be made that the ‘death or substantial bodily harm’ exception applies.” Id.
153. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
154. See Miller, supra note 30, at 397. Inmates are exposed to the risk of sexual assault, inmate
violence and communicable diseases from the start of their sentences: “[f]irst, in comparison to the
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has been found to have a profound impact on individual health, morbidity, and
stress-related illness.155 These substantial risk factors are amplified for those
dealing with the added stressors of being innocent behind bars.156 In analyzing
the totality of the incarceration experience, data on the long-term health of
exonerees after release strengthens the argument that wrongful incarceration
causes substantial bodily harm. Through a thorough analysis of all the
mitigating factors, in tandem with existing scientific data on the effects of
incarceration on the health of the inmate generally, and life after exoneration,
we find a correlation strong enough to support wrongful incarceration as a
“reasonably certain” cause of “substantial bodily harm.”157
III. MRPC RULE 1.6 SHOULD BE UNIVERSALLY INTERPRETED TO ENCOMPASS
WRONGFUL INCARCERATION AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY
RULE
Arguably, “one of the most powerful arguments in favor of an attorney’s right
to reveal confidential information about a wrongful incarceration is that Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1)’s exception to prevent ‘reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm’ already encapsulates such a right.”158 When an attorney is faced
with the choice between breaching the duty of confidentiality or allowing
non-incarcerated, inmates face an increased risk of physical violence based upon factors such as
the concentration of violent individuals, overcrowding, prison culture, the inability of prisoners to
physically separate themselves, the prevalence of drug use, and prison guard brutality.” Id. Sexual
assault risk is prevalent, yet often under reported to due to unwritten “inmate norm[s] against
snitching and possible retaliation.” Id. Finally, the increased threat of communicable diseases can
be attributed to overcrowded conditions and poor health care in general. Id.
155. See generally Michael Massoglia & William Alex Pridemore, Incarceration and Health,
41 ANN. REV. OF SOCIO. 291 (2018).
156. Konvisser, supra note 28, at 250–51. Because of “this extreme, abrupt discontinuity in
a person’s life experience, psychiatric disorders, particularly dissociative disorders, may occur;
PTSD, adjustment disorders, generalized anxiety disorder, and dysthymic disorder also frequently
arise. In addition to the acute trauma of a false arrest and imprisonment, long term consequences
ensue that are pathogenic themselves . . . .” Id.
157. Exonerated Nation has looked at the impact of incarceration on the wrongfully convicted,
and determined that there are significant negative physical and mental health effects of
incarceration that are unique to this population. See generally EXONERATED NATION,
https://exoneratednation.org/ (last visited, Oct. 24, 2020).
The trauma of wrongful imprisonment is irreversible: This trauma manifested in multiple
ways, including in feelings of being re-victimized upon release due to the refusal of the
jurisdictions that wrongly convicted them to accept accountability for their unjust
actions. In fact, some jurisdictions continued to pursue charges against the exonerees,
resulting in on-going trauma.
Newsletter of the California Exoneree Health & Well-Being Project, TOURO UNIV. CAL. PUB.
HEALTH
PROGRAM
&
EXONERATED
NATION,
https://exoneratednation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/CEHW-Project-Newsletter-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
158. Inbal Hasbani, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a Wrongful
Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277,
288 (2010).
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another to remain in prison, the attorney should have the option to choose
disclosure. If the information is credible, justice demands that the attorney have
the option to report that information so an investigation can be conducted to
determine if an error was made in the conviction of another.159
A specific, codified exception to MRPC 1.6 for wrongful incarceration is not
necessary. “[P]rolonged incarceration already falls under the existing exception.
Th[is] argument is predicated on the likelihood of death or bodily harm
increasing exponentially when a person is imprisoned.”160 MRPC Rule 1.6 in
its current form provides the language needed for attorneys facing a disclosure
dilemma when in possession of confidential information that could exonerate
another. All states should interpret the substantial bodily harm exception in
MRPC Rule 1.6 to include wrongful incarceration. To illustrate this point,
consider the following hypothetical.
Client A is represented by Attorney 1. Client B is represented by Attorney 2.
The clients and attorneys do not know each other, and have no connections.
Client A is tried and convicted for the non-capital crime of armed robbery
(therefore there is no death penalty issue to consider). Client A maintains her
innocence throughout trial, but the jury returns a unanimous guilty verdict.
While Client A is awaiting sentencing, Client B is arrested and charged with
assault. Because this is a third offense, Client B is facing prison. During a
meeting with her attorney, Client B is distracted by the news ticker on the office
television. She reads that Client A has just been sentenced to ten years in prison
for the armed robbery of a local restaurant. Client B immediately breathes a
loud sigh of relief and informs her attorney that “at least that job won’t be tacked
on to this one.” Attorney 2 asks Client B what she means and she replies, “Client
A didn’t rob that joint, I did. But oh well.” Attorney 2 tells Client B about her
right to remain silent and the duty of confidentiality, but also asks Client B to
allow her to breach this confidence and notify the District Attorney that the
wrong person is going to prison. Client B refuses, saying “the only way you can
reveal this secret is if I’m dead.”
In this scenario, Attorney 2 should be able to rely on MRPC 1.6(b)(1) to reveal
the confidence in an effort to exonerate Client A. “The idea of allowing or
requiring attorneys to disclose client information to prevent the wrongful
incarceration or execution of another is not new.”161 There have been multiple
attempts to amend the MRPC to allow for such an interpretation.162 Proponents
159. Kirchmeier, supra note 66, at 222 (“[A]n attorney should consider one’s own obligation
as someone who knows that an innocent person has been convicted of a crime . . . a lawyer may
have a moral obligation to sacrifice a bar license to save an innocent person.”).
160. Rowe, supra note 36, at 300.
161. Miller, supra note 30, at 393.
162. Id. at 393–94 (outlining the history of proposed changes to the model rules that paved the
way for the current rules in Massachusetts and Alaska). Earlier discussions about changing MRPC
1.6 date back to 1979 when such an amendment was first proposed. Id. at 393. When this
amendment was met with controversy, it was tabled until 1981. Id. In 1981, a new proposal was
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of this type of interpretation, particularly in cases involving wrongful
incarceration, look to issues of attorney morality in framing their support.163
Parallel to questions of morality are balancing tests that consider other instances
under the rules where breaches of confidentiality are permitted. “For example .
. . an attorney may disclose the confidences of a client who is defrauding Chase
Home Mortgage via mortgage fraud, but is barred from disclosing the
confidences of a client who has confessed to a murder for which an innocent
person is incarcerated.”164 This seems to imply that financial considerations
supersede the moral conundrum of allowing an innocent person to remain in
prison. If the goal of the MRPC is to maintain the integrity of the profession in
the eyes of the public, it is necessary to restructure this seeming hierarchy.165 As
Professor Colin Miller, argues,
[S]tates that have adopted some form of amended Model Rule 1.6 can
and should read an implied wrongful incarceration/execution
exception into their existing rules while the remaining . . . states (and
the District of Columbia) that have not adopted some form of amended
Model Rule 1.6 should amend their rules to create such an exception
and can do so while causing less violence to the rationales behind
attorney-client confidentiality than existing exceptions.166
In fairness, the idea that Rule 1.6(b)(1) covers wrongful incarceration as an
exception to the confidentiality rule must be viewed in tandem with the reality
presented however, this iteration only addressed future acts by the ‘confessing’ client. Id. Such
language did not find its way into the rule until 1983, but remained forward thinking; only
addressing an act by the client that was set to occur, not a prior criminal act. Id. at 394. It was not
until the 2002 version that all future tense was removed, creating the present rule. Id.
163. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 188.
It is unethical, with few exceptions, for attorneys to reveal client confidences . . .
This ethical rule may pose an obstacle to responsible lawyering. It prevents attorneys
from revealing knowledge that they feel a moral obligation to divulge and that might not
be protected in court. It fosters an amoral approach to representation that feeds the
public’s perception that attorneys are a mercenary breed. Its application sometimes has
results that neither practitioners nor lay persons expect or welcome. Finally, it
unreasonably impinges on the First Amendment rights of individuals who are obligated
to uphold the Constitution.
Sharp, supra note 38, at 79.
164. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 188. “In other words, the rule creates a hierarchy where the
property interests of a giant corporate entity are more important than the liberty interests of an
innocent, incarcerated human being.” Id.; see also Miller, supra note 30, at 393 (discussing the
stark contrast between instances where confidentiality can be breached to protect financial interests,
but not to exonerate the wrongfully incarcerated).
165. Kirchmeier, supra note 66, at 222–23.
[O]ne might argue that the lawyer does a job where confidentiality is essential to the
system and if the lawyer breaches that confidentiality, it harms the system. But one might
respond that saving an innocent person from a life in prison is more important than
playing a role in the legal system.
Id.
166. Miller, supra note 30, at 393.
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that an attorney coming forward with a client’s confession does not guarantee
exoneration.167 The rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of any
information provided by the attorney still must be taken into account. In the
Alton Logan case, the confession alone was not enough to secure his release.168
Because of this, it can be argued that the breach of confidentiality harms the
judicial system in any scenario where the prevention of substantial bodily harm
(in this case wrongful incarceration) is not guaranteed.169 This also puts the
attorney in a position to second-guess both the decisions of a lower court and the
efficacy of the incarcerated individual’s prior representation.170 Finally, the
confessing client’s constitutional right against self-incrimination must be taken
into account. In the hypothetical, Client B was never tried for the crime for
which Client A was wrongfully convicted, therefore there was no issue of double
jeopardy.171 However, because a citizen does not have to self-incriminate, does
that ultimately mean that no one will be held accountable for the subject crime?
IV. CONCLUSION
Incarceration for a crime one did not commit causes substantial bodily harm.
The constant threat of physical and sexual violence, the fear of being in an
environment without autonomy, the lack of sound nutrition, the substandard
medical care, and mental health disorders all manifest in physical detriment that
rises to the bar of “reasonable certainty” required by the MRCP 1.6 substantial
bodily harm exception. Massachusetts and Alaska have codified a specific
wrongful incarceration exception into their model rules, but such an act is not
necessary. A universal interpretation of the existing rule to read in a wrongful
incarceration exception can alleviate the moral and professional dilemma faced
by attorneys who are in possession of client confessions that could help save an
innocent life from harm. This can be accomplished while maintaining the
integrity of the profession and the long standing tenet of attorney-client
privilege. Humanity should weigh just as heavily as duty. There should be a
167. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 168–69 (expanding on the point that disclosure does not equal
exoneration). The currently incarcerated individual who is claiming innocence was already found
guilty by a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt, and, to challenge that conviction, one would
essentially be second-guessing the decision of the lower court. Id.
168. LOGAN, supra note 1, at 95. While the hidden affidavit was pivotal in obtaining a new
trial, that evidence was viewed in tandem with new physical evidence that, when viewed together,
ultimately secured Logan’s release. Id. at 95, 98. There was in fact no guarantee that the confession
alone would exonerate.
169. Kirchmeier, supra note 66, at 227 (discussing the deleterious effects of breaking attorneyclient privilege on the overall integrity of the profession).
170. Vuletich, supra note 33, at 193 (stating that “construing an exception in the rule—absent
a specific exception—leaves an attorney who is struggling with whether to disclose a client’s
confidences to rectify wrongful incarceration vulnerable to the ‘after the fact,’ ‘second guessing’
of attorney-discipline prosecutors and courts”).
171. Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining double jeopardy
as a second prosecution or sentence for the same offense).
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sense of moral outrage at the thought of leaving the innocent, languishing in
prison, for the self-serving interest of avoiding professional sanction. Above all,
disclosure should be an attorney’s choice. MRPC 1.6 makes that choice
possible.
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